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DE RUEHFN #0477 2671759  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
R 231759Z SEP 08  
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2221  
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS FREETOWN 000477

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

DS/IP/AF, DS/DSS/CC, AF/W, AF/EX, S/CT, CA

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PINR](#) [PTER](#) [SL](#)

SUBJECT: EAC DISCUSSES RECENT ATTACKS IN YEMEN AND PAKISTAN  
AND CURRENT SECURITY POSTURE

¶1. (SBU) On September 23, 2008, the Embassy Emergency Action Committee (EAC) convened to discuss the recent attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen on September 17, 2008 and the Marriott in Islamabad, Pakistan on September 20, 2008. Present were the Charge, DAO, ARSO, CON, USAID, A/POL, and PAO.

¶2. (SBU) The ARSO briefed the EAC on the above mentioned attacks and went over the current security posture of post. The EAC reviewed the security procedures and expressed concern that there is only one access road to and from the Embassy. The road is narrow and riddled with pot holes and the derbies that wash down from the slope of the hill on one side. The opposite side has an eight (8) foot cinder block wall that covers the complete length of the road up to the front area of the Embassy. The wall is the rear boundary to the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) compound. The concern was that this access road is an extreme choke point where there is a steep hill on one side and a cinder wall on the other. In the event of an emergency turning around or backing out could not be done in an expedited manner. There is a section of the IMATT wall that has a vehicle gate leading into the IMATT compound. The EAC requested that the RSO contact the IMATT security personnel and see if a possible emergency egress route be instituted, and review other security concerns and procedures.

¶3. (U) The EAC concluded that the current normal security posture is adequate. ARSO, however, reminded EAC members of the importance of being security conscious at all times and stressed staff to remain vigilant, to include reporting all possible surveillance activity and to practice operational security. The ARSO also spoke with the Local Guard Force (LGF) Commander, Surveillance Detection (SD) Coordinator, and the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) liaison and reminded them of the same and to reiterate this their team members.  
FEDZER